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Sexual Violence, Female Agencies, and Sexual Consent: 
Complexities of Sexual Violence in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide 
Jennie E. Burnet 
  
Sexual violence—ranging from forced marriage to rape to sexual torture and mutilation—was 
used as a weapon of genocide to torture, terrorize, or kill Tutsi women and girls and to reward 
militiamen and male civilians who participated in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.1 The majority 
of psychological, legal, and human rights research on sexual violence in Rwanda has focused on 
sexual violence perpetrated by Hutu perpetrators against Tutsi victims (see for example, Taylor 
1999; Brunet and Helal 1998; Mukamana 2008; Zraly 2008; Zraly and Nyirazinyoye 2010).2 
Yet, sexual violence was a significant threat for women from all ethnic groups in Rwanda during 
the prolonged civil war, which began on October 1, 1990 and ended sometime in 2001.3 To 
indicate the scope of the problem, an epidemiological survey of 921 women who lived in 
Rwanda in 1994 found that 45.8 percent of them had been raped (Fabri et al. 2007, 5).  
As Sarah Soh (2008, 3) demonstrated in her study of Korean ‘comfort women’ during the 
Second World War, scholars must situate sexual violence associated with war in the context of 
‘everyday gender violence’ and in the ‘structural power’ of the political economy to understand 
the extents of its social meaning and impact on survivors. In this chapter, I show how sexual 
violence in the genocide was shaped by pre-genocide social contexts and political economy. 
Then, I explore forms of sexual conduct that are conditioned by the wartime political economies 
but that may not constitute sexual harm. Rwandan women and girls exercised their sexual agency 
in the conflict zone within “a social field of action,” to borrow Eric Wolf’s (1994, 219) concept, 
that made some behaviors impossible and some behaviors more possible than others. I conclude 
by discussing the importance of acknowledging female sexual agency in conflict zones. As 
Dianne Otto (2007, 38) asserts, conflating all forms of sex in conflict zones as harm undermines 
women and children’s rights because it reinforces “conservative hierarchies of gender and 
sexuality” and “diverts attention away from the searing poverty that characterizes transitional 
post-conflict societies.” Obscuring the complexity of sexual encounters in the context of violent 
conflict—whether these encounters are violent, transactional, pleasurable, or labour— denies 
women’s agency. It also ignores the reality that initiating sexual encounters can be a coping 
strategy in the aftermath of conflict and violence.  
 
Social & Historical Contexts: The Political Economy of Everyday Gender Violence 
Genocide & Civil War: The 1994 genocide, in which at least 500,000 Tutsi and politically-
moderate Hutu lost their lives in state-sanctioned massacres, occurred in the midst of a civil war, 
which began in October 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel movement based 
in Uganda, invaded Rwanda. 4 The genocide ended when the RPF seized the capital, Kigali, on 
July 4, 1994. In mid-July 1994, the RPF named a transitional government, which it called the 
“Government of National Unity.” The new government remained vulnerable due to the two 
million or so Rwandan refugees living just outside Rwanda’s borders with Zaire (now 
Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Tanzania. The ousted government, former military, and 
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militia groups used refugee camps as bases from which to launch armed attacks on Rwanda to 
destabilize the new regime in Kigali. To end this threat, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA, the 
armed wing of the RPF) invaded Zaire to forcibly dismantle the camps in October 1996. This 
invasion led to the mass return of approximately one million refugees to Rwanda and to the 
massacres of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan (civilian) refugees in the rainforests of eastern 
Zaire.5 Following the mass refugee return, an insurgency based in northern and western 
Rwandan emerged to contest RPF rule. The RPA’s counterinsurgency operations created a very 
difficult, uncertain context for civilians in northern and western Rwanda who were victimized by 
combatants on both sides of the conflict. The insurgency lasted until approximately July 2001 
when the RPA pushed the insurgents out of northwestern Rwandan into Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (Human Rights Watch 2002). 
  Ethnicity & Genocide:  Virtually any glyph of Rwanda states that the population is 
comprised of three ethnic ‘groups’: Tutsi at 15 percent of the population, Hutu at 84 percent, and 
Twa at less than 1 percent.6 Yet, the origin of these widely cited statistics is unclear. They 
themselves form part of the “mythico-histories,” a term I borrow from Malkki (1995), that 
structure reality. Despite the widely accepted mythico-history of separate origins for the three so-
called ‘ethnic groups’, historical linguistic and archeological evidence indicate that the people 
who populated what today is Rwanda have shared similar ways of life, language, and culture 
since approximately 500 BCE (Schoenbrun 1998, 155). Although genocide perpetrators targeted 
victims based on these ascribed identities, so called ‘age-old ethnic hatred’ (or tribalism) was not 
the cause of the genocide (Straus 2006). Rather, the killings were the result of political 
strategizing and conscious choices by a political and economic elite who desired to maintain 
their power. At the local level, community members identified Tutsi neighbors based on local 
knowledge of ethnic identity. In killings organized at the regional or national level, genocide 
perpetrators used national identity cards to help identify targets. Often, perpetrators relied on 
stereotypical, physical markers of ‘Tutsiness’, which included a tall, slender frame; aquiline nose 
with small nostrils; long, narrow fingers or feet; dark (instead of pink) gums in the mouth; and a 
tan (instead of a pink) skin tone on the palms of the hands or soles of the feet. For women, the 
rule of thumb was often beauty. Since colonial times, Tutsi women were heralded as great 
beauties by European colonizers (Taylor 1999, 170). The Hutu extremist, racist propaganda 
leading up to the genocide reinforced these ideas. As a result, all beautiful women risked 
becoming victims during the genocide. 
Everyday Gender Violence:  Sexual violence during the civil war took place in a legal, 
political, historical, and cultural context of patriarchy and gender discrimination. With the 
exception of Meredeth Turshen’s (2001) comparative analysis of sexual violence in Rwanda and 
Mozambique, few scholars have situated the sexual violence of the 1994 genocide in the context 
of everyday gender violence or the structural power of the political economy. Rwandan women 
faced a great deal of gender discrimination before the 1994 genocide. The colonial legacy had 
undermined women’s economic autonomy so that it was virtually impossible for them to control 
resources without interference from husbands, fathers, or brothers (Jefremovas 1991, 2002; 
Burnet 2012, Turshen 2001). Under Rwanda’s system of patrilineal kinship, widows, married 
women and unmarried girls derived their social identities from the men to whom they were 
related. A Rwandan proverb states, ‘Abagore ntibafite ubwoko –wives have no identity’, 
meaning as a girl, a woman had the same identity as her father or brothers, but as a wife she took 
on the identity of her husband and his patrilineage.7 Female labour was at the center of Rwandan 
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agricultural production in the precolonial and colonial periods. With the exception of a few 
regional ethnic groups, such as the Bagogwe in the northwest, or the Bahima in the northeast, 
most households, whether ‘Hutu’ or ‘Tutsi’ subsisted primarily from agriculture with small 
livestock supplementing economic production. The colonial period wrought many changes in 
Rwandan gender roles as the economy became monetized, and the colonial state pushed 
Rwandan husbands/men into the cash economy and excluded Rwandan wives/women from the 
cash economy (Jefremovas 1991, 2002). Many of the sources of girls’ and women’s power 
within marriages and kin groups were undermined by these changes thus further subordinating 
females to males. In the recent past, wives have been responsible for cultivating all food for the 
household on land belonging to her husband or his lineage while husbands focused on the 
production of cash crops, managed the livestock, or migrated in search of paid labor (Jefremovas 
2002, 87). 
Although women gained some legal protections in the postcolonial period, they remained 
largely subordinated to men. The 1991 constitution guaranteed the equality of all people before 
the law, but numerous legal codes subordinated women to men in the home and in the public 
sphere (Kamatali and Gafishi 2000, 188). Patriarchal ideas about the roles of women as well as 
an education system that limited access to secondary education meant far fewer girls than boys 
attended post-primary school. According to World Bank Development Indicators, in 1990 the 
ratio of female to male primary enrollment was 96 percent for primary school, 71 percent for 
secondary, and only 22 percent for tertiary school. Banking, commercial, and land ownership 
laws limited women’s opportunities to participate in the cash economy. The vast majority of 
Rwandan women worked in the agricultural sector as subsistence farmers working on land 
owned by their husbands or their husbands’ family (Burnet and RISD 2003). Women could not 
seek salaried work without the approval of their husbands, and women required their husband’s 
signature to open a bank account (Names withheld, pers. comm.,  1999, 2000). While some 
women became successful entrepreneurs, their businesses were vulnerable, in practice and by 
law, to plunder or to complete takeover by their husbands (Jefremovas 1991, 2002, 97-108).  
 
Sexual Violence Before, During and After the 1994 Genocide 
Before, during and after the genocide, rape and sexual violence became a common feature of the 
social landscape that already considered many forms of gender-based violence, such as wife-
beating, normal. The Rwandan civil war from 1990 until 1994, the genocide between April and 
July 1994, the refugee camps in eastern Zaire and western Tanzania, and the insurgency between 
1997 and 2001 were all characterized by high rates of sexual violence. Sexual assaults on women 
and girls increased dramatically following the advent of the civil war in 1990.8 As the general 
state of security in the country declined, members of the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi 
militias, the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR—the Rwandan army), and other opportunists 
committed acts of sexual violence with impunity (Human Rights Watch 1993, 11). During the 
genocide, rape was widespread and Rwandan women faced brutal acts of sexual violence: 
individual rape, gang rape, rape with objects, sexual slavery, and sexual mutilation (Human 
Rights Watch 1996, 39). Both Tutsi and Hutu women became victims of sexual violence but 
Tutsi women and girls were targeted in a systematic fashion. Rape became a weapon of genocide 
used to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group as well as “to terrorize the community and warn all people 
of the futility of resistance—those targeted as victims as well as those who might wish to protect 
the intended targets” (Turshen 2001, 59).9  
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Beyond physical brutality, sexual violence during the genocide intersected with symbolic 
and psychosocial violence. Tutsi women and girls were raped and then told that bullets should 
not be “wasted” on them because they would “die of AIDS,” presumably contracted during the 
rapes (Names withheld, pers. comm., 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002). Extremist rhetoric targeted Tutsi 
beauty and desirability—militiamen were promised the opportunity for sexual intercourse with 
Tutsi as a reward for their “work.” Rape survivors frequently reported that perpetrators said that 
they wanted “to see if Tutsi women were like Hutu women” (Human Rights Watch 1996, 42). 
Many perpetrators insulted Tutsi women for “their supposed arrogance” while being raped (Des 
Forges 1999, 215). Beauty as a marker of Tutsi-ness was so strong in the popular imagination 
that Hutu women who were perceived as beautiful risked being mistaken for Tutsi and raped, 
sexually tortured, or even killed (Names withheld, pers. comm., 1998, 2000, 2002, 2009). 
A third aspect of sexual violence in the genocide was the political economy of rape. 
Perpetrators systematically stripped Tutsi of their assets as one strategy of genocide. Tutsi homes 
and businesses were looted and burned; soldiers, militiamen, and civilian perpetrators were 
“rewarded” for their “work” with property taken from Tutsis. Tutsi women and girls were often 
treated as property (Turshen 2001). FAR soldiers took girls from schools as umusanzu (a 
contribution to the war effort) (Des Forges 1999, 216; Turshen 2001, 60). The genocide planners 
also treated “women’s productive and reproductive capacities as property” (Turshen 2001, 61). 
In some communities, local authorities worked to keep the Tutsi wives of Hutu men alive 
because “depriving a man of the productive and reproductive capacities of his wife harmed his 
interests” and could diminish these men’s willingness to support the genocide (Des Forges 1999, 
296). Women’s reproductive capacity and land rights were bundled as “reward” for militiamen: 
girls were given to militiamen as “wives” along with their families’ land (Human Rights Watch 
1996, 59-60). Finally, the genocide planners and perpetrators sought to destroy Tutsi women’s 
reproductive labour through rape by preventing them from bearing children for their own 
community by making them unacceptable to their community through their violation or by 
physically destroying their capacity to bear children through mutilation (Turshen 2001, 62). 
Indeed, female genocide survivors who were raped find it difficult to marry because they are 
treated as spoiled goods (Burnet 2012) 
After the genocide, sexual violence continued in different forms. The RPA was much 
more disciplined than the FAR had been. RPA soldiers did not engage in widespread rape 
following the RPF’s victory, but two practices resembled sexual violence. In the internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) camps behind RPA lines, RPA soldiers solicited women and girls who 
had been saved from genocide for a “reward” or for “some victory,” meaning sexual intercourse 
(Names withheld, pers. comm., 1998, 2002). While it is almost certainly true that these women 
and girls ‘consented’ to these sexual encounters in that they did not say  ‘no’, it is difficult to 
discern whether they felt like they had a choice or whether these were “choiceless decisions.”10 
In a second common practice, RPA soldiers asked Tutsi women married to Hutu men to leave 
their husbands, “saying those marriages must have been the consequence of rape” (Turshen 
2001, 63). If the women refused, their husbands would be arrested on accusations of genocide 
and imprisoned—an almost certain death warrant between 1994 and 1997 given the abysmal 
prison conditions (Turshen 2001, 63). The women would then be forced to marry a RPA soldier 
(Twagiramariya and Turshen 1998, 112).    
For Rwandan civilians in the refugee camps in eastern Zaire or western Tanzania as well 
as neighboring civilian populations, rape was a common occurrence, and perpetrators faced no 
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consequences. Little detailed information about sexual violence during the height of the 
insurgency (1998-1999) is available because foreign researchers had little or no access to these 
communities at this time. Survivors of attacks against civilians have been reluctant to give 
testimony for fear of reprisals from the current government. In 2000 and 2001, Rwandan women 
in northwestern Rwanda cited rape as a pressing social problem for women and girls (Names 
withheld, pers. comm., 2000, 2001, 2002). They explained that unidentified perpetrators targeted 
individual women or girls who were walking alone on errands. Government interventions at the 
time were ineffective because perpetrators were long gone before gendarmes and local 
authorities arrived from provincial headquarters. By 2009, women in the same community stated 
that the problem had been solved by local authorities working closely with the population 
following national government awareness raising campaigns about the problem of child sexual 
violence in 2002 and 2003.  Training of the national police between 2003 and the present to 
handle investigations of sexual assault was also cited as a significant improvement (Names 
withheld, pers. comm., 2009). 
 
Female Sexual Agency & Sexual Consent in Conflict Zones 
 In her work on sex workers in the United Kingdom, Day highlighted the importance in 
clarifying indigenous categories of “rape” because they are not uniform across cultures (Day 
1994, 172). According to Day, rape is commonly defined as “non-consensual sex” or “non-
consensual sexual intercourse” (Day 1994, 172). This definition raises some significant 
conceptual problems when used in Rwanda—as well as many other African countries—because 
women do not give explicit, verbal consent to sexual intercourse. Among Rwandans and many 
other African cultural groups, modesty is a feminine ideal. Unmarried girls/women are expected 
to uphold a cultural ideal of “modest virgins” devoid of any sexual knowledge or urges 
(Jefremovas 1991, 2002). Because explicit expressions of sexual desire are considered immodest, 
female consent is usually signaled implicitly through non-verbal cues or situational consent. By 
“situational consent,” I mean a woman or girl’s willingness to be in a particular place, at a 
particular time, with a particular person. For instance, a woman who agrees to spend the night 
with a man in his home or a hotel is agreeing, in effect, to sex. In the past (and even today), 
married women gave non-verbal cues to their husbands to indicate sexual desire such as cooking 
a special meal, wearing attractive clothing, attending to her husband’s physical comfort, or 
lighting a pipe of tobacco and giving it to her husband at bedtime (Musabyimana 2006, 79). 
Rwandan cultural values precluded rape in marriage because a wife’s consent was given upon 
wedding, and a wife could not refuse to have intercourse with her husband unless she was sick or 
menstruating (Musabyimana 2006, 79).11 Thus, the emic cultural model of rape differs 
substantially from the European and American consent model. Work by Go et al (2003) on 
socially acceptable forms of domestic violence in India and by Harvey (1994) on socially 
acceptable forms of domestic violence in the highlands of Peru suggest that many other cultural 
contexts have similar implicit or situational consent models. 
Research on sexual violence in Rwanda during the genocide conducted in late 1994 and 
early 1995 was complicated by the fact that there was no precise vocabulary in Kinyarwanda for 
“rape” or sexual violence (Human Rights Watch 1996). Article 350 of the 1977 Rwandan penal 
code defined rape as a crime punishable by five to ten years imprisonment (Human Rights Watch 
1996, 36).  In research on child sexual assault conducted in 2002, I found that Rwandans usually 
expressed the concept ‘rape”’ with the formulation “gufata ku ngufu-to take by force,” which 
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suggests that ‘rape’ was conceived of involving violence (Names withheld, pers. comm., 2002). 
A former military policeman confirmed this when he explained that in the absence of any other 
means he looked for signs of physical violence on an alleged victim’s body in order to determine 
whether she had been raped (Names withheld, pers. comm., 2002). Given the country’s dense 
population, there was a cultural assumption that ‘rape’ understood as sex by force was 
impossible during non-conflict times because a potential victim could simply yell out for 
assistance to interrupt the attack (Names withheld, pers. comm., 2002).  
Thus, Rwandan cultural models focused on dealing with instances of improper sexual 
relations—a man/husband having sexual intercourse with an ‘unauthorized’ woman such as the 
woman/wife of a different patrilineage or an unmarried girl. In these instances, the offending 
man’s patrilineage would offer gifts such as beer and livestock to compensate the lineage to 
whom the wife or unmarried girl belonged. The wife most likely faced a severe beating at the 
hands of her husband, father-in-law or brothers-in-law, and risked being sent back to her own 
patrilineage without her children because her consent was assumed to have been given. In 
instances of an unmarried man and an unmarried girl caught en flagrant délit, a marriage 
between the two lineages would render improper sexual relations proper. If marriage was not 
viewed as a favorable outcome, the unmarried girl would most likely face a severe beating at the 
hands of her father or brothers for bringing shame to the family through her immodesty. 
Knowledge of her ‘mistake’ would also lower the potential brideprice her lineage could seek 
during marriage negotiations. The man’s lineage was required to make gifts of traditional beer or 
livestock to the girl’s male relatives to compensate for this damage to the lineage’s economic and 
reproductive interests. Thus, existing data from published research and my own interviews 
suggest that Rwandan cultural models for coping with sexual violence largely position female 
survivors as passive and voiceless.  
A great deal of international scholarship and policy research has focused on the issue of 
sexual violence in conflict zones.12 In conflict zones, however, there are many different types of 
sexual encounters, many of which do not conceptually fit into legal definitions of sexual 
violence. Put simply, a great deal of sex for a variety of reasons— for “pleasure, labour, comfort, 
intimacy, adventure, curiosity, or livelihood, for example” —occurs in conflict zones as 
elsewhere (Otto 2007, 37). Yet, these encounters are conditioned by the circumstances of violent 
conflict.13 For instance, many young women exercise their sexual agency in conflict zones by 
trading sexual access to their bodies for the means of survival: food, water, clothing, money. The 
degree to which these women choose is highly contingent on the structural factors determined by 
the conflict. How do women and girls refuse sexual intercourse when the implicit signs of 
consent (accepting food, clothing, shelter, protection, etc.) are the means of survival?  
The question of sexual consent in conflict zones raises the problem of sexual consent in 
resource poor environments more generally. In many local contexts, virginity, or the appearance 
of virginity, and sexual access are important social capital for women and girls. This social 
capital can be translated into economic capital or at least the means to survival. Rwanda before 
and after the violent conflict and genocide of the 1990s constituted a resource poor setting. In pre 
and post-genocide Rwanda, prostitution, defined as the beforehand negotiated exchange of 
money or goods for sex, was extremely rare. Instead, transactional sex, defined as the exchange 
of sex for money, food, clothing, or other resources, was common. The majority of transactional 
sexual encounters in Rwanda consist of a ‘date’ followed by money, goods, or other resources 
provided the morning after rather than a beforehand negotiated exchange of money or goods for 
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sex. Scores of educated, young women in Kigali spend their time in restaurants and bars 
frequented by foreign tourists and aid workers in the hopes of finding a wealthy foreign 
boyfriend who will shower them with gifts and, in the girls’ wildest dreams, propose marriage 
and a gateway to Europe, the United States, or Canada. Even in contemporary Rwandan 
marriages, male economic contributions to the household economy can resemble, at least on the 
symbolic plane, an exchange of money or goods for sexual access to or for the reproductive 
labour of women. In this context, prostitution, transactional sex, and forced marriage can be 
placed on a continuum of sexual economic exchanges along with ‘dating’ and even marriage.14   
Beyond the sexual agency women exercise—sometimes in exchange for survival 
necessities—research shows that rape and sexual violence survivors also exercise agency in the 
face of difficult circumstances. In Punjab in 1947, the social fiction of “practical kinship” 
allowed raped or forcibly married women to be incorporated into families and communities 
when the women’s natal families and communities would have rejected them (Das 1995). Raped 
women in Bosnia exercised similar agency to find a socially acceptable place for themselves in 
the aftermath of the conflict (Hayden 2000). Yet, sexual violence’s long-term impacts on female 
agency have been less well studied.  
Maggie Zraly and Laetitia Nyirazinyoye (2010) found that some genocide-rape survivors 
in southern Rwanda joined solidarity associations and deployed a variety of coping mechanisms 
to continue living; yet, this type of social support is not available to other sexual violence 
survivors in Rwanda. Data from my ethnographic research in Rwanda suggest that rape survivors 
who do not fit the Hutu-perpetrator/Tutsi-victim dyad remained silent because their experiences 
did not fit the paradigmatic version of Rwandan history promoted by the RPF government 
(Burnet 2009, 2012). Hutu women raped by FAR soldiers or Interahamwe militiamen during the 
civil war and genocide are hidden by the dominant narrative which depicts rape as a tool used 
against Tutsi women by Hutu perpetrators. The option of speaking out publicly about their 
experiences is not available to Hutu women who will either be disbelieved—because Hutu 
women are not perceived as genocide targets—or rejected by their husbands and families—
because of the ‘shame’ of their violated status. Women coerced into sexual relationships or 
forced into marriage with RPA soldiers do not have access to social services for rape survivors 
unless they altered their narratives and called the perpetrators “Interahamwe.” Finally, an 
unknown number of (Hutu and Tutsi) women remained in marriages that began as ‘forced’ 
marriages. These women dare not talk about how their relationships began for fear of being 
thrown out by their husbands or husbands’ families.  
 
Conclusion 
Representations of genocide rape and sexual violence, as well as legal proceedings and 
human rights research have tended to focus on sexual violence committed by Hutu perpetrators 
against Tutsi victims during the genocide. This focus has hidden an unknown number of sexual 
violence survivors from view and obscured the complexity and contradictions of sexual violence 
during violent conflict. Some women and girls initiate sexual relationships out of individual 
sexual desire, as a means to secure their own or their families’ survival, or because they face a 
choiceless decision where other options either do not exist or are less desirable. Finally, the focus 
on sexual violence in the genocide detaches the question of female sexual consent from the 
cultural historical context and political economy of poverty that structures women’s agency and 
limits their options. 
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This narrow focus oversimplifies the problem whereby the larger question of sexual 
consent in non-violent contexts remains unplumbed. The assumption that European or North 
American models of sexual consent are relevant to other contexts ignores significant differences 
in the social construction of sexuality and marginalizes emic cultural models. In addition, it can 
be argued that the question of sexual consent in Europe and North America remains 
unresolved.15  
Since the majority of post-genocide interventions for sexual violence survivors in 
Rwanda assisted mostly Tutsi victims or Hutu widows-of-the-genocide, many (perhaps even 
most) sexual violence survivors remain hidden by the paradigmatic public discourse on sexual 
violence, by their own shame, and by the cultural requirement for silence in matters of sexual 
violence. This case study points to the need for more open frameworks for confronting instances 
of sexual violence during violent conflict, ones that make it possible for more victims to come 
forward for medical, psychological and social support. Furthermore, it points to the need to 
address the structural violence of wartime political economies that leave poor women and girls 
vulnerable to sexual exploitation and trafficking because they face choiceless decisions to ensure 
their or their families’ survival. As Soh pointed out in the case of Japan’s comfort stations during 
WWII, “the comfort system encompassed both commercial and criminal sex” (Soh 2008, 108, 
emphasis in original). United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on gender-based and 
sexual violence in conflict zones as well as the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin in 2003 on the 
sexual conduct of peacekeepers are important steps in the right direction.16 Yet, as Otto (2007, 
35) and Toupin (this volume) note the directives outlined in the Secretary-General’s bulletin rob 
women, as well as male peacekeepers, of their sexual agency. As Otto (2007, 34) argues there is 
a need to examine the real differences between women’s “experiences of consensual and non-
consensual sexual conduct, no matter how fine those distinctions are.” Thus, human rights 
lawyers and academic researchers should investigate in a systematic fashion the degree to which 
all militarized sex encompasses this divide.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 This essay draws from data collected during dissertation research in Rwanda between 1997 and 
2001, during consultancies for CARE-Rwanda in 2002, and from more recent research trips in 
2007 and 2009. I would like to thank the Government of Rwanda and the Ministry of Gender and 
Women in Development for authorizing and facilitating my dissertation research and the 
Ministry of Health for authorizing more recent research. The research was funded by the Office 
of the Executive Vice President for Research and the College of Arts & Sciences of the 
University of Louisville from the University of Louisville, by the Joan B Kroc Institute for 
International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, by the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill, by the United States Institution for Peace, by the United States Department of 
Education, and by the National Science Foundation. My eternal gratitude goes to my Rwandan 
interpreters: Bernadette, Dancille, and Elise. 
2 Human Rights Watch (1996, 2004) and Alison Des Forges (1999) have maintained a more 
balanced approach that includes accounts of sexual violence perpetrated against Hutu women. 
3 These beginning and end dates for the Rwandan civil war are somewhat controversial. The 
most commonly cited dates for the civil war are from October 1, 1990 when the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda until July 14, 1994 when the RPF captured Kigali and ended the 
genocide. As the RPF advanced, the regime responsible for the genocide along with the army, 
the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR), and the extremist Hutu militias, such as the Interahamwe, 
who helped carry out the genocide, fled into exile in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) and Tanzania. Nearly two million civilians went with them. From 1994 until 1996, these 
refugees lived not far from the Rwandan border and the former government used the refugee 
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camps as bases from which they launched attacks on the new, RPF-led government in Rwanda. 
The RPF government solved this problem by planning and directing a “Banyamulenge uprising” 
in eastern Zaire in September 1996 (Reyntjens 2009, 50-57), which came to be known as the  
Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL). The AFDL 
attacked the Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Zaire sending a flood of approximately one 
million civilians back into Rwanda between October 1996 and May 1997. Following the return 
of these refugees, an insurgency comprised of members of the former government and army, 
returning refugees, and new recruits, fought against the RPF in northern and western Rwanda 
between 1997 and 2001 (Reytjens 2009, 173-178, 194-201). Although I cite early 2001 as the 
end-date of the Rwandan civil war, the ongoing wars in Democratic Republic of the Congo can 
be seen, at least in part, as an exportation of Rwanda’s internal conflict. 
4 Estimates of how many people died in the 1994 genocide vary widely. While how many died is 
irrelevant to whether or not the killings in Rwanda in 1994 were genocide, the issue is highly 
politicized so it is necessary to indicate the sources. The number I use here comes from Alison 
Des Forges (1999, 15). For more on the numbers of dead see Straus 2006: 41-64. 
5 Rwanda’s invasion also led to the defeat of the Zairean army and overthrow of President 
Mobutu Sese Seko’s government by the rebel alliance, Alliance des Forces Démocratique pour 
la Libération du Congo (AFDL). The AFDL initially served as a Zairean/Congolese cover for 
Rwanda’s invasion fronted by the exiled Zairean Joseph Kabila, but it eventually gained 
autonomy from Rwanda’s central command and threw the Rwandans out in 1998. 
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6 See for example the CIA Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/rw.html or Wikipedia.org http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rwanda, accessed August 
27, 2011. 
7 Today in Rwanda, the standard translation for this proverb is “wives have no ethnicity.”  
However, the Kinyarwanda word translated here as “ethnicity,” ubwoko, literally means “sort” or 
“type” and can be applied to monkeys, trees or bananas as easily as to people. Prior to the 1950s, 
ethnicity was not the primary way that Rwandans classified each other.  At that time, the term 
ubwoko, when referring to human beings, meant the combination of a person’s social attributes 
relevant to a given context, hence I translate ubwoko in this proverb as “identity.”   
8 This assessment is based on information gleaned during interviews with Rwandans conducted 
between 1995 and 2011. Official statistics of sexual assaults in Rwanda before 1994 are not 
available. 
9 The sexual violence took many forms. For example, Interahamwe militia men often raped or 
sexually tortured Tutsi women before killing them (Human Rights Watch 1996). Perpetrators 
sometimes mutilated women by cutting off their breasts, puncturing the vagina with sharp 
objects, or disfiguring body parts that looked ‘Tutsi’ such as long fingers or thin noses (Des 
Forges 1999, 215). In other cases, Tutsi women were sexually enslaved or ‘married’ by 
Interahamwe militiamen in exchange for having their lives saved (Human Rights Watch 1996). 
10 In her study of policy agency among female members of the Irish republican movement in 
Northern Ireland, Aretxaga (1997) used the term “choiceless decisions” to describe the ways 
women’s ‘decisions’ were highly circumscribed by social, economic and political contexts.   
11 The 2008 law against gender-based violence made rape in marriage a criminal offense. 
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12 See for example the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, and 1889. 
13 Dianne Otto (2007, 56), for instance, writes, “sexual exchanges between peacekeeping 
personnel and the host population are shaped by the complex political economies of post-conflict 
reconstruction and the specific gendered and sexualized cultures of UN humanitarianism.” 
14 Mark Hunter (2002, 2007) has found similar relationships in South Africa. 
15 See, for example, the attempts in 2010 by a United States Senator to redefine rape in the 
United States as involving force.  
16 Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and 
abuse, ST/SGB/2003/13, October 9, 2003.  
